This paper explores consequences of technology spillovers that is accompanied by a Northern firm's F DI in the South and enhances a Southern firm's product quality. To this end, we explore an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which a Northern firm and a Southern firm compete in the Southern market. By undertaking F DI, the Northern firm can reduce its production costs and avoid tariff, but its advanced technology spills over to the Southern firm and enhances the Southern firm's product quality. We find that, under certain range of parameterizations, the Northern firm strategically reduces the level of its product quality upon F DI. In such cases, F DI can hurt the South and, at the same time, the spillover rate that maximizes global welfare could be positive but lower than South-optimal level. This results support the roles played by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in reconciling the North-South conflict concerning Intellectual Property Rights.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (F DI) induces technology spillovers, which often enhances local firms' quality standards. That is, if a foreign firm builds its manufacturing plant in a less developed country, local competitors can enhance their product quality by learning the foreign firm's performance, or by employing workers from the foreign firm.
1 Throughout this paper, this phenomenon is referred to as quality-enhancing technology spillovers. For example, Chery Automobile, a Chinese automaker, hired a number of engineers from the Nissan-Dongfeng joint venture which was established upon Nissan's F DI in China. The resulting technology spillovers through these engineers have significantly improved Chery's car quality (Luo, 2005) . Similarly, the investment of U.S. software firms in Bangalore since 1984 has also created technological and information externalities to Indian software firms. Consequently, this has enabled the local firms to produce softwares which meet international standard (Patibandla, Kapur & Petersen 1999 , Pack & Saggi 2006 . In section 2, we present real-world examples of quality-enhancing technology spillovers in more detail.
In anticipation of the potential benefits of technology spillovers, Southern governments often induce F DI in industries where local firms need to learn advanced technology and know-how from foreign firms. In the case of Chinese automobile industry, Chinese government imposed high tariff rates on imports of foreign cars to induce foreign automakers to undertake F DI in China.
2 In a similar move, Indian government promoted F DI in software sector by enforcing the copyright act. This has strengthened the Intellectual Property Rights (IP R) protection for both local and foreign firms upon production in India.
3 These types of policy have proved to be sucessful in attracting F DI into a number of industries where local firms need to learn technologies from foreign firms.
Despite the important interconnections among technology spillovers, F DI, and IP R protection and trade policy, to the best of our knowledge, no papers have previously explored theoretical models that capture this interconnection in the context of quality-enhancing spillovers. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by exploring a model that incorporates quality-enhancing spillovers in an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. We identify conditions under which a Northern firm undertakes F DI in the South, investigate how spillover and tariff rates affect firms' profitability, consumer surplus, and welfare, and discuss policy implications of our analysis.
Our model is based on the standard product-line pricing framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978) , where we focus on two types of consumers as in Waldman (1996 Waldman ( , 1997 , Glass and Saggi (1998) , and Davis, Murphy, and Topel (2004) . In our model, a Northern firm (firm N ) and a Southern firm (firm S) compete in the Southern market which consists of highvaluation and low-valuation consumers. Each firm chooses its product quality, where the production cost is increasing in quality level. Firm N has a superior technology in the sense that firm N does not have binding constraint on its choice of product quality whereas firm S cannot choose the profit maximizing quality level due to its technological limitation. Firm S is located in the South, while firm N can locate in the North (home-production) or in the South (F DI). By undertaking F DI, firm N can avoid tariff.
1 However, a certain fraction of firm N 's technology spills over to firm S under F DI, and the technology spillover increases the highest possible level of quality firm S can choose for its product.
The rate of technology spillover, denoted by θ (∈ [0, 1)) and interpreted representing the 2 Chinese automobile industry developed quickly in late 1990s and early 2000s following investment of foreign automakers. High levels of trade barrier, evidenced by average tariff rate for complete vehicles of around 50% in 1999 and remained around 30% in 2005 even after China became a member of WTO in 2001, have induced foreign automakers to set up their manufacturing plants in China (Gallagher, 2003; Luo, 2005) .
3 With the enforcement of the copyright act, in [1989] [1990] domestic firms launched about 120 new software products and foreign firms about 160 (Patibandla et al. 1999) .
1 Qualitative nature of our results would remain unchanged under an alternative setup in which firm N can also save production costs (such as labor costs) and transport costs by undertaking F DI. See the last paragraph of subsection 4.1.
strength of IP R protection in the South, is a key parameter in our model. We find that firm N undertakes F DI when θ is relatively small and/or the tariff rate is relatively high, and the resulting technology spillover increases both firm S's profitability and Southern consumers' surplus.
When firm N undertakes F DI, it may choose a relatively low quality level for its product in order to reduce the amount of technology that spills over to firm S. Consequently, the equilibrium level of firm N 's product quality can be lower under FDI than under homeproduction. We call this phenomenon as firm N 's strategic quality reduction, which happens under a broad range of parameterizations in our model. This is a new finding in the analyses of international oligopoly models, and consistent with real-world observations. For instance, Gallagher (2003) reports that, Chrysler and Ford brought with them dated technologies to China and, as a result, the quality of cars they manufactured and sold in China by these firms was below the quality of cars they manufactured and sold in Japanese or the U.S. markets (see Section 2 for details).
Firm N 's strategic quality reduction is the main driving force of the following two welfare consequences and policy implications in our model. First, F DI may hurt the South in the sense that Southern welfare can be lower under F DI than under home-production. This finding suggests that, when Southern governments formulate IP R protection and trade policy, they should carefully assess impacts of quality-enhancing technology spillovers accompanied by F DI, especially when Northern firms are expected to strategically reduce their product quality upon F DI. Second, the socially optimal spillover rate, which maximizes the sum of Northern welfare and Southern welfare, is strictly higher than the North-optimal level but it can be strictly less than the South-optimal level. This finding suggests that international organizations such as W T O have an active role to play in reconciling North-South conflicts regarding IP R protection. See Section 6 for details.
A number of papers have previously studied models of technology spillovers in NorthSouth trade contexts, where technology spillovers reduce production costs in these models (see Section 3). We contribute to the literature by exploring quality-enhancing spillovers under the vertical product differentiation model. As the level of IP R protection decreases, larger amount of technology spills over to Southern firms but innovating firms have lower incentives to invest in their R&D activities. Previous papers in the literature analyzed this important trade-off and explored its welfare consequences and policy implications. In our analysis, the trade-off arises not from lower R&D incentives but from the Northern firm's strategic quality reduction. Our analysis suggests that this new trade-off is also important when we consider economic impacts and welfare consequences of technology spillovers and IP R protection in North-South trade contexts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents real-world examples of quality-enhancing technology spillovers, followed by literature review in Section 3. Section 4 presents our model and undertakes its equililrium characterization. Section 5 explores economic and welfare consequences of spillover rates and tariff rates, followed by discussions on policy implications of our findings in Section 6. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
Quality-enhancing Technology Spillovers: Examples
Recently, UNCTAD (2000) have identified various channels under which technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms can take place. These include (i) labor mobility between foreign firms and local firms, and (ii) proximity between foreign firms and local firms which leads to the upgrade of technological level in the host country.
6 UNCTAD has also argued that, multinational firms' entry leads to an increase in product quality, variety and innovation in host economies, but little evidence that it leads to lower prices. In this section, we consider real world cases of quality-enhancing technology spillovers that is induced by F DI.
Let us consider first the case of Bangladesh garment industry where Desh (a Bangladesh firm) and Daewoo (a Korean firm) collaborated in 1980, under which Daewoo trained 130 workers in Desh to manufacture high quality clothing products. Rhee (1990) reported that, only a few years after this collaboration, 115 workers have left the company to either work for other competing firms or run their own business.
7 As a result, not only could Desh produce high quality clothes but firms that benefited from these workers were also capable of manufacturing high quality clothing products. UNCTAD (1992) also discusses this case and argues that, these 115 workers were major agents for imparting the skills throughout the whole garment industry in Bangladesh. 6 UNCTAD has also defined F DI which leads to strong links to the domestic economy, such as that associated with advanced technology and/or spillovers effects, as "high quality" F DI. See also a discussion on international technology diffusion in Keller (2004) . 7 Rhee points out that, prior to 1980, the clothing industry in Bangladesh was outdated and could not export to the world market. In 1979, Desh signed an agreement with Daewoo, which was then a leading firm in the world for clothing products, under which Daewoo invested in technical training, plant start-up, and marketing activities for Desh. Desh then produced clothing products under supervision and consultancy from Daewoo. Daewoo trained 130 Desh workers in Korea in 7 months which enabled them to produce high quality products, and later sent a team to train other workers in Desh factory in 1980. Consequently, Desh successfully produced high quality clothing products and exported them under Daewoo's network, where Desh also learned marketing skills, quality upgrading from Daewoo. Desh experienced significant increase in its product quality: its value per piece increased from $1.3 in 1980 to $2.3 in 1986.
8 Along this line, UNCTAD (1992) also reports technology spillovers from Yamaha-Escorts collaboration in India to other local firms through the channel of labor mobility. Similarly, Thompson (2003) finds that labor mobility as a channel for quality-enhancing technology spillovers from foreign (mainly Hong Kong) firms to local firms has also been observed in garment industry in China. His survey shows that, local firms have attempted to copy Hong Kong firms' production processes and techniques, learn their managerial practices, and particularly hire Hong Kong firms' employees. In his survey, about 13,000 workers per annum Quality-enhancing technology spillovers from foreign to local firms have not only been observed in sectors that are labor intensive such as garment and textile, but also in other sectors such as information technology and manufacturing. Patibandla et al. (1999) documented that, the investment of Texas Instruments in Bangalore in 1984 and other U.S. software firms in late 1980s created significant technological and information externalities to Indian firms. As such, this gave the Indian firms access to the trend in the software market in the world and enabled them to move to the higher-end market (see also Pack & Saggi 2006) .
Recently, as pointed out by various authors, Chinese car manufacturers have learned from foreign competitors on how to manufacture high quality cars and/or improve the quality of cars to be sold in the local market (Gallagher, 2003; Luo, 2005) .
9 Employing workers with experience from foreign firms was the practice used by many Chinese automakers. For instance, Chery Automobile, during its early development time hired engineers from NissanDongfeng joint venture which was set up upon Nissan's investment in China, to develop new products (Luo, 2005) . This is a typical example of what has often been observed in Chinese automobile industry in recent years. That is, on average, the quality of cars made by Chinese manufacturers has increased sharply as they benefited from foreign automakers' presence in China. The 2007 survey of J.D. Power in China's automobile market indicated that the average number of problems per 100 vehicles produced by local firms in China was 368, compared to 800 in 2000 (Li 2007) .
What are the strategies employed by multinationals to deal with the resulting qualityenhancing technology spillovers upon F DI? It was observed that in many cases, Northern firms intentionally brought dated technologies to the South to produce goods of lower quality when compared to similar products they produced at home factories. As such, they could decrease the amount of technology that spills over to local competitors. Gallagher (2003) showed that Chrysler and Ford brought dated technologies to China to produce cars which did not meet quality requirement of Japan, the United States or Europe and thus could only be sold in China's market. Ernst & Young (2005) also reported that, Volkswagen initially brought obsolete models along with factories and engines needed to build them from Europe to China. Similarly, Japanese firms often brought technologies at their mature period to Malaysian electronics industry (Praussello, 2005) . As these examples reveal, choosing low quality level for their products is an usual practice that many Northern firms use to cope with resulting quality-enhancing technology spillovers in the South.
In summary, the Northern firms' production in the South often creates positive externalities to local firms and helps improve local firms' product quality. This paper considers left Hong Kong firms and many of these workers later worked for local firms.
9 China only allows foreign automakers to form joint venture with local firms but not wholly owned foreign company, as the government wants foreign firms to share technologies with local partners (Qiu, 2005 ). a theoretical model that captures these phenomena, and explores policy implications of quality-enhancing technology spillovers.
Relationships to the Literature
This section surveys previous papers that have studied models of technology spillovers in North-South trade contexts, and discuss our contributions to the literature.
10 In a seminal contribution to this literature, Chin and Grossman (1990) study a Cournot duopoly model in which a Northern firm competes with a Southern firm in an integrated world market. They assume that both firms have access to a standard technology, however only the Northern firm can invest in R&D in order to lower its production costs. The level of spillovers is interpreted to reflect the strength of IP R protection. Chin and Grossman consider two polar cases of complete protection or no protection, where the Southern firm can imitate the Northern firm's technology under no protection. They find that the interests of the North and the South generally conflict regarding IP R protection, with the South benefitting from no protection and the North benefitting from complete protection. Complete protection may or may not enhance global welfare in their analysis.Žigić (1998) extends Chin and Grossman's model by considering a continuum of IP R protection between the two polar cases.Žigić finds that the North-South conflict regarding IP R protection does not necessarily arise in this extension, showing the congruence of interests between North and South when the level of R&D efficiency is relatively high. Diwan and Rodrik (1991) consider the incentives of the North and the South to provide patent protection in a model that allows for a continuum of potential technologies with a different distribution of preferences over them in the North and the South. The Northern and Southern markets are segmented and entry into the R&D section in the North is free in their model. They find that a benevolent global planner which places greater weight on the South's welfare would require higher level of IP R protection in the North.
12 Deardorff (1992) studies the impact of extending patent protection from innovating country to another country. He shows that, if the size of the innovating country is large, this spreads of patent protection benefits innovating country, harms the other country and the total impact on 10 Many authors have empirically investigated technology spillovers from foreign firms to local firms upon F DI, where technology spillovers are often measured by changes in local firms' productivity. The findings along this line are mixed. For instance, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find negative impact of F DI on local firms' productivity using data from 4,000 Venezuelan firms; Djankov and Hoekman (2000) find negative spillovers in Czech Republic; while Haddad and Harrison (1993) find positive relationship between F DI and productivity in manufacturing sector in Morocco. See also Carluccio and Fally (2010) for a survey.
11 See alsoŽigić (2000) and Kim and Lapan (2008) for related analyses. 12 In their model, to maximize the global welfare (which is the equally weighted sum of the North's and the South's welfare), the levels of IP R protection in the two regions must be identical.
global welfare is negative. Helpman (1993) examines the debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of IP R within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them. He finds that tightening IP R protection in the South hurts the South and may or may not benefit the North. Lai and Qiu (2003) explore a model in which firms in both the North and the South can innovate, and IP R protection in each region is represented by the length of patent protection. Comparing the Nash equilibrium IP R protection standard of the South with that of the North, they find that the former is weaker than the latter. They also show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IP R standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market.
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Papers mentioned above do not address the link between F DI and technology spillovers, which is a focus of our analysis. Saggi (1999, 2002) and Naghavi (2007) have previously explored this link. Glass and Saggi (2002) construct a Cournot oligopoly model in which a source firm has a superior technology compared to a host firm, and they compete by producing a homogeneous good for a market outside the host country. Workers employed by the source firm acquire knowledge of its superior technology. F DI helps the source firm to save production costs, but it may induce its workers to work for the host firm. With the knowledge acquired from the source firm, these workers can produce the product at lower costs. The source firm may pay a wage premium to prevent the local firm from hisring its workers and thus gaining access to their knowledge (technology spillovers). Glass and Saggi find that the host government has an incentive to attract F DI because of technology spillovers to local firms or the wage premium earned by employees of the source firm. However, when F DI is particularly attractive to the source firm, the host government has an incentive to discourage F DI. 14 Naghavi (2007) considers a cost-reducing technology spillovers model in which a Northern firm can choose to either export or undertake F DI in a Southern country, which has a 13 See Grossman and Lai (2004) for a related analysis. 14 Glass and Saggi (1999) develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of F DI on technology transfer from the North to the South and welfare. Three types of firms are considered: Northern firm producing in the North; Northern multinationals producing in the South; and Southern firm producing in the South. In this set up, Northern firms and multinationals innovate while Southern firms imitate, and all of them serve consumers in both the North and the South. In steady state, the amount of imitated products of both Northern firms and multinationals are fully replaced by newly innovated (with quality improvement) products. Glass and Saggi find that, if F DI is the only channel for technology transfer (that is, the Southern firms only imitate technologies of the multinationals) then the increase in F DI inflows raises the rate of imitation, innovation North, and improves welfare for both the North and the South. However, if F DI co-exists with imitation as channels for technology transfer (that is, the Southern firms imitate technologies of both multinationals and Northern firms in the North) then the increase in F DI does not affect the rate of imitation, innovation, raises Southern welfare and has ambiguous impact on Northern welfare. potential competitor. The game consists of five stages, starting with Southern government choosing its IP R policy, represented by the spillover rate. In the second stage, the Northern firm chooses its mode of entry. If it chooses export, it will be the monopolist in the Southern market and the game proceeds to the third stage where the Southern government chooses its optimal tariff rate. If the Northern firm chooses F DI instead, a Southern firm could emerge and benefit from the technology spillovers from the Northern firm. In the forth stage, the Northern firm chooses the level of R&D investment. The final stage is the production stage, in which the firms compete in quantity. Naghavi finds that stringent IP R regime in the South induces the Northern firm to undertake F DI. The resulting F DI improves Southern welfare whenever the Northern firm's F DI induces entry of the Southern firm. Hence, the Southern government can maximize Southern welfare by choosing the highest possible spillover rate that still induces Northern firm to undertake F DI.
The present paper contributes to the literature by studying the link between F DI and technology spillovers in the context of quality-enhancing spillovers. To this end, we explore a model that incorporates quality-enhancing technology spillovers in an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. Our paper is the first one, to the best of our knowledge, to study such a model.
15 As in Glass and Saggi (2002) , the Northern firm has technological advantage compared to the Southern firm in our model. 16 As mentioned in Introduction, we identify a new trade-off regarding IP R protection. That is, as the level of IP R protection decreases, larger amount of technology spills over to the Southern firm but the level of the Northern firm's product quality gets further below the socially optimal level because of strategic quality reduction. We will explore welfare consequences and policy implications of this trade-off in later sections.
line pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) and focus on two-types of consumers. The two-type consumers approach in this framework has been adopted to analyze durable goods pricing (Waldman, 1996 (Waldman, , 1997 , international technology transfer with quality ladders (Glass and Saggi, 1998) , and entry impact on product design (Davis, Murphy, and Topel, 2004) . We then characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNEs) of the model, and demonstrate that strategic reduction of the Northern firm's product quality occurs when the rate of technology spillover is relatively small.
The Model
We consider a Northern firm (firm N ) and a Southern firm (firm S) compete in the Southern market. Firm S is located in the South, while firm N can locate itself in the North (homeproduction, denoted HP ) or in the South (F DI). Let q k (≥ 0, k = N , S) denote the quality of firm k's product.
On the demand side, there are two groups of consumers, denoted H (type H consumers) and L (type L consumers), where group j consists of a continuum of nonatomic consumers of mass m j , j = H, L. A representative individual in group j consumes either zero units or one unit of the products, and derives a gross benefit of v j q k from the consumption of one unit of quality q k product, where
We assume that, firm N can choose any quality level for its product, q N . 17 Meanwhile, firm S, using less advanced technology, can only choose a quality level for its product up to a certain upper bound value. This value differs for F DI and HP . Specifically, when firm N locates itself in the North, the maximum possible quality level firm S can choose is given byq S . When firm N undertakes F DI, technology spillovers extend this upper bound quality level and the maximum quality level firm S can choose for its product is given bŷ q S (q N ) = max(q S + θ(q N −q S ),q S ), θ ∈ [0, 1). In our model, θ captures the degree of technology spillovers from firm N to firm S, which can only happen under F DI. Hence, when firm N undertakes F DI and chooses q N >q S , the higher θ enables firm S to choose a higher product quality.
Each firm k can produce a product of quality q k at a constant marginal cost of c(q k ) with zero fixed costs, where c(·) is a twice-continuously differentiable function with c (·) > 0 and c (·) > 0. To derive closed form solutions, we assume that c(
We consider a three-stage game, described below.
[Stage 1] Firm N determines whether to locate itself in the North (HP ) or in the South (F DI).
17 All our results would remain unchanged under an alternative assumption that firm N can choose any
Firm N chooses quality level q N for its product. Having observed q N , firm S chooses quality level q S , subject to q S ≤q S (q N ). [Stage 3] Firms N and S simultaneously set prices for their own product, and consumers make their purchase decisions.
Notice that the game described above has two stage 2 subgames, one is HP subgame in which firm N locates itself in the North, while the other is F DI subgame in which firm N locates itself in the South.
We end this subsection by presenting two remarks. First, a basic assumption of our model is that firm N has a superior technology compared to firm S in the sense that firm N can choose any quality level for its product, q N (or it can choose q N ≤q N whereq N ≥ v H ; see footnote 17). This assumption is consistent with Markusen's (1995) discussion on the theory of the multinational enterprise, which is based on Hymer (1976) and Dunning (1981) . Markusen points out that, if foreign multinational enterprises are exactly identical to domestic firms, they will not find it profitable to enter the domestic market because there are added costs of doing business in another country including communications and transport costs, higher costs of stationing personnel aborad, and barriers due to language and customs. Therefore, he argues, the multinational enterprise must arise due to the fact that it possesses some special advantage such as superior technology or lower costs due to scale economies. Dunning (1981) labels this type of advantage as ownership advantage. In their theoretical analysis of multinational firms and technology transfer, Glass and Saggi (2002) assume that a multinational firm has a superior technology compared to local firms because of ownership advantages.
Second, we focus on the case in which there is no cost of production (so that the firms only incur costs associated with quality development and tariffs). In reality, production cost is positive and depends on where the firm is located. For instance, with HP , there are transport costs that the Northern firm has to incur when exporting its output to the South. With F DI, the Northern firm can save on transport costs and at the same time exploit the lower wages in the South. These factors potentially make Southern production relatively attractive for the Northern firm, even though it might also need to pay additional costs due to the operation in an unfamiliar environment. It is thus straightforward to assume that, beside tariff t, there is an extra cost disadvantage of Northern production per unit of output, w. In this case, the total disadvantages of Northern production is captured by t + w, rather than t as presented above. Analyzing the model with the inclusion of w, however, would leave all of our results unchanged, so that we have ignored w in this paper to focus the attention of readers on welfare consequences of tariff and spillver rates.
18
18 Detailed analysis for the inclusion of w in our model is available upon requests by interested readers.
Equilibrium Characterization
Throughout our analysis we assume thatq S < v L holds. Ifq S ≥ v L holds, thenq S does not impose a binding constraint on firm S's choice of quality level, since firm S can choose its profit-maximizing quality level, v L , without technology spillovers as shown later in this section. Hence, by assumingq S < v L , we focus on cases in which quality-enhancing technology spillover can play a role.
We derive Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the model described above. We focus on a range of parameterizations in which firm N sells its product to all type H consumers and firm S sells its product to all type L consumers in the equilibrium. Following Davis et al. (2004) and Glass and Saggi (1998) , we call this type of equilibrium as a separating equilibrium. Note that all proofs are presented in the Appendix. Proposition 1. There exists an unique valuem H > 0 such that the game has a separating equilibrium if and only if m H >m H . Furthermore, if m H >m H , the separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game.
To understand the logic behind Proposition 1, let us first consider the case in which the spillover rate, θ, is equal to zero. This implies that, technology does not spill over from firm N to firm S even when firm N chooses to locate itself in the South. In this case, firm N 's optimal choice in Stage 1 is to locate itself in the South to avoid the tariff.
Suppose that the game has a separating equilibrium when θ = 0. In equilibrium, firm N sells its product with quality q N at a price of p N to m H type H consumers, while firm S sells its product with quality q S at a price of p S to m L type L consumers. We find that
where q N > q S .
19 Firm S extracts all surplus from type L consumers by charging p S = v L q S . If a type H consumer purchases firm S's product at p S , the consumer's net benefit is
Then, in order for firm N to sell its product to type H consumers, it must leave the same amount of surplus, (v H − v L )q S , to be captured by the consumers, and hence
Then, the equilibrium profits of firms N and S are π N (q N ) and π S (q S ) respectively, where
When θ = 0, firm S's maximum possible quality level is not affected by firm N 's quality level q N , and henceq S (q N ) =q S for all q N . Givenq S < v L , firm S chooses q S =q S to maximize π S (q S ) whereas firm N chooses q N = v H to maximize π N (q N ), at stage 2 in equilibrium.
20
Proposition 1 tells us that the number of type H consumers, m H , must be greater than a threshold valuem H for the game to have a separating equilibrium. This is because, if m H is lower than the threshold, ignoring type L consumers is no longer firm N 's optimal choice, and firm N is strictly better off by selling its product to both types of consumers.
In the case of θ > 0, the positive spillover rate can negatively affect firm N 's profitability. This is because technology spillover can increase firm S's product quality by increasing its maximum possible quality level. This in turn increases the amount of surplus, (v H − v L )q S , that firm N must offer to type H consumers to ensure their purchase of firm N 's product, resulting in the reduction of firm N 's profitability. Firm N continues to undertake F DI when the value of θ is relatively small, but may switch to home-production when θ becomes higher. In any case, Proposition 1 again tells us that m H must be greater than a threshold for the game to have a separating equilibrium, because, otherwise, firm N will be strictly better off by selling its product to both types of consumers.
Next we turn to Proposition 2, which tells us that if m H >m H , the unique equilibrium of the game is an F DI equilibrium if θ is relatively small, and it is an HP equilibrium otherwise. Proposition 2. Suppose m H >m H . There exist a value θ * ∈ (0, 1] such that the equilibrium of the game is an F DI equilibrium if θ ≤ θ * , and it is an HP equilibrium if θ > θ * . Furthermore, there exists a valuet ≥ 0 such that θ * (< 1) is strictly increasing in t if t <t, and θ * = 1 otherwise.
As mentioned above, firm N chooses to undertake F DI if θ = 0, and an increase in θ reduces firm N 's profitability. Firm N 's disadvantage of home-production is that it has to pay the specific tariff t. Proposition 2 tells us that if the tariff rate is relatively low, there exists a threshold θ * < 1 such that firm N chooses home-production over F DI if θ is greater than θ * . The threshold θ * is increasing in t, because firm N 's disadvantage of home-production is increasing in t. And, when t exceeds the thresholdt, firm N undertakes F DI for all θ ∈ [0, 1) (that is, θ * = 1). We now establish Proposition 3, which tells us that strategic reduction of firm N 's product quality occurs when θ is relatively small. Proposition 3. Suppose m H >m H , and let q * k denote the equilibrium level of firm k's product quality. There exists a thresholdθ,θ ∈ (0, θ * ], such that (i) and (ii) below hold in the equilibrium of the game.
If the spillover rate θ is high enough satisfying θ > θ * , firm N chooses home-production to avoid technology spillovers. Since there is no spillover, firm S chooses q * S =q S as in the case of θ = 0 explained above. Firm N then chooses q *
Notice that the profit-maximizing level of firm N 's product quality under home-production, q * N = v H , coincides with the socially optimal quality level, because the net social benefit associated with the consumption of firm N 's product by type
Proposition 3 (i) tells us that firm N chooses q * N = v H when θ >θ, and it chooses a lower quality level (1 − θ)v H + θv L when θ ≤θ. This result, referred to as strategic reduction of firm N 's product quality, can be explained as follows. Consider the equilibrium of the F DI subgame. Given firm N 's quality choice q N , firm S chooses q S to maximize
denote firm S's best response function. By anticipating firm S's response to q N , firm N chooses q N to maximize its profit in the subsequent equilibrium, which is
We find that the candidates for the profit-maximizing level of firm N 's product quality are q N = v H and q N = (1−θ)v H +θv L . If the level of q N does not impose a binding constraint on firm S's choice of q S then firm N chooses q *
which is lower than v H , to reduce the amount of technology spillovers from firm N to firm S.
Notice that, without the constraint
holds, then the constraint is not binding at both candidates
, then the constraint is binding at both candidates
We find that there exists a unique valueθ ∈ (0, 1) such that, in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, firm N chooses q *
Finally, we defineθ ≡ min{θ, θ * } in order to state this result in terms of the equilibrium of the entire game, leading to Proposition 3.
Finally, the following lemma will be useful when we explore welfare consequences of IP R protection in the next section. Lemma 1.θ < θ * = 1 if t ≥t, andθ = θ * < 1 otherwise.
If t ≥t, firm N chooses F DI for all θ ∈ [0, 1) (that is, θ * = 1) by Proposition 2. Lemma 1 tells us that firm N chooses q * N = v H if θ is relatively large satisfying θ >θ, and strategically reduces its product quality to q *
If t <t, firm N chooses F DI if θ is relatively small satisfying θ ≤ θ * , and choose homeproduction otherwise (Proposition 2). Lemma 1 tells us thatθ = θ * holds in this case. This means that, whenever firm N chooses F DI in the equilibrium (that is, whenever θ ≤ θ * holds), firm N strategically reduces its product quality (that is, θ ≤θ holds). To see whŷ θ = θ * holds in this case, supposeθ < θ * < 1 holds. For any θ ∈ (θ, θ * ], firm N prefers F DI to home-production (because θ ≤ θ * ), and q * N = v H and q * S = v L hold in the equilibrium (because θ >θ). Firm N 's equilibrium profit is then constant for all θ ∈ (θ, θ * ], and is strictly greater than its profit under home-production. Then, since firm N 's equilibrium profit in the home-production subgame is constant for all θ, firm N should be strictly better off by choosing F DI over home-production for all θ >θ, and hence θ * = 1 should hold instead of θ * < 1. This in turn means that, if θ * < 1, thenθ = θ * must hold. In summary, we have shown that the game has a separating equilibrium if and only if the population of type H consumers is relatively large. The separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, which is an F DI equilibrium if the spillover rate θ is relatively low and it is an HP equilibrium otherwise. We have also found that F DI reduces the equilibrium quality of firm N 's product from the socially optimal level v H to a suboptimal level (1 − θ)v H + θv L when θ is relatively low. This is because, by reducing its product quality, firm N can reduce the amount of technology that spills over to firm S, and this in turn increases firm N 's profitability.
Impacts of quality-enhancing technology spillovers
In this section we will investigate impacts of quality-enhancing technology spillovers on firms' profits, Southern consumers, Southern welfare, and global welfare. To this end, we will undertake comparative statics exercises concerning the spillover rate θ, and identify and compare optimal spillover rates θ S and θ W that respectively maximize Southern welfare and global welfare. We will then present an outline of comparative statics results concerning tariff rates. Finally, given that Firm N 's strategic quality reduction is a central result of our model, we ... .
Economic and welfare consequences of spillover rates
We undertake comparative statics exercises concerning the spillover rate θ, focusing on the cases in which the equilibrium of the game is a separating equilibrium for all θ ∈ [0, 1).
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Let π N (θ), π S (θ), CS(θ), W S (θ), and W (θ) denote the profit of the Northern firm and the Southern firm, consumer surplus, Southern welfare, and global welfare in the equilibrium of the game, respectively. We present our results under two cases; the case of t ≥t (Case I) and t <t (Case II). See Proposition 2 for the definition oft.
Case I: t ≥t
Recall thatθ < θ * = 1 holds if t ≥t by Lemma 1. That is, firm N undertakes F DI for all θ ∈ [0, 1) and strategically reduces its product quality by choosing q *
(ii) π S (θ), CS(θ) and W S (θ) are strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0,θ]. Furthermore,
CS(θ) and W S (θ) are constant for all θ ∈ (θ, 1).
When θ ∈ [0,θ], firm N undertakes F DI and imposes a binding constraint on firm S's quality choice by choosing q *
Holding else constant, an increase in θ extends firm S's upper bound quality level. Firm N partially offsets this effect by reducing its product quality (that is, q * N = (1 − θ)v H + θv L decreases as θ increases), but firm S's equilibrium quality q * S =q S + θ(q * N −q S ) is still increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0,θ]. That is, the direct (positive) impact of an increase in spillover rate on firm S's equilibrium quality outweighs the indirect (negative) impact of firm N 's strategic reduction of its product quality. Firm N 's equilibrium profit π N (θ) is strictly decreasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0,θ]. In the equilibrium, firm S captures all surplus from type L consumers by charing p * S = v L q * S to them, whereas firm N leaves a rent of (v H − v L )q * S to be captured by type H consumers. Hence the equilibrium consumer surplus is given by
S is strictly increasing in θ, both π S (θ) and CS(θ) are also strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0,θ].
When θ =θ, firm N is indifferent between choosing q N = (1 −θ)v H +θv L and q N = v H . And, once θ exceedsθ, it becomes too costly for firm N to impose a binding constraint on firm S's quality choice, and hence firm N chooses q * π S (θ)| θ∈(θ,1) > π S (θ) and CS(θ)| θ∈(θ,1) > CS(θ) hold, where π S (θ) and CS(θ) are constant for all θ ∈ (θ, 1). Concerning Southern welfare, notice that Southern government receives no tariff revenue for all θ ∈ [0, 1) in the equilibrium, because firm N undertakes F DI for all θ ∈ [0, 1) in case I. Equilibrium Southern welfare is then given by W S (θ) = π S (θ) + CS(θ), and hence W S (θ) shares the same properties with π S (θ) and CS(θ) as Proposition 4 (ii) tells us.
Next we turn to global welfare, which is the sum of the net social benefit associated with the consumption of firm N 's product,
]. Hence q N = v H and q S = v L are global welfare-maximizing levels of firm N 's product quality and firm S's product quality, respectively. This leads us to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. For any given θ ∈ (θ, 1), W (θ ) > W (θ) holds for all θ ∈ [0,θ], where W (θ ) is constant for all θ ∈ (θ, 1).
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As mentioned above, firm N chooses q * N = v H and firm S chooses q * S = v L in the equilibrium for all θ ∈ (θ, 1). In contrast, if θ ∈ [0,θ], firm N strategically reduces its product quality to (1 − θ)v H + θv L , which in turn reduces firm S's product quality as well. Hence equilibrium global welfare achieves the maximum possible level when θ ∈ (θ, 1).
Finally, Propositions 4 (ii) and 5 together imply the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let θ S and θ W respectively denote the optimal spillover rates for Southern welfare and global welfare. Then θ S ∈ (θ, 1) and θ W ∈ (θ, 1) hold.
In case I considered here, the strategic reduction of firm N 's product quality reduces Southern welfare as well as global welfare. Hence, Southern welfare and global welfare are both maximized when θ exceedsθ so that it is too costly for firm N to strategically reduce its product quality in order to impose a binding constraint on firm S's choice of product quality.
Case II: t <t
Recall thatθ = θ * < 1 holds if t <t by Lemma 1. That is, firm N undertakes F DI and strategically reduces its product quality by choosing q *
(ii) π S (θ) and CS(θ) are strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0, θ * ], and π S (θ * ) > π S (θ)| θ∈(θ * ,1) and CS(θ * ) > CS(θ)| θ∈(θ * ,1) hold, where π S (θ) and CS(θ) are constant for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1).
Given θ * =θ, properties of π N (θ), π S (θ), and CS(θ) in the interval [0, θ * ] are same as the ones presented in Proposition 4 for case I. That is, when θ ∈ [0, θ * ], firm N undertakes F DI and imposes a binding constraint on firm S's quality choice by choosing q *
is strictly decreasing in θ whereas π S (θ) and CS(θ) are strictly increasing in θ.
When θ = θ * , firm N is indifferent between choosing F DI with q N = (1 − θ)v H + θv L and HP with q N = v H . And, once θ exceeds θ * , it becomes too costly for firm N to undertake F DI, and it chooses HP . This is the key difference between Cases I and II. Since the tariff rate t is relatively small in case II, home production becomes firm N 's optimal choice when θ exceeds θ * . Since there is no technology spillover under HP , firm S's equilibrium quality level q * S is reduced discontinuously fromq S + θ * (q * N −q S ) toq S once θ exceeds θ * . Then, π S (θ) and CS(θ) are both discontinuously reduced when firm N switches from F DI to HP , because π S (θ) and CS(θ) are increasing in the level of firm S's product quality. Therefore we have that π S (θ * ) > π S (θ)| θ∈(θ * ,1) and CS(θ * ) > CS(θ)| θ∈(θ * ,1) hold, where π S (θ) and CS(θ) are constant for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1). Now we turn to Southern welfare. When θ ∈ [0, θ * ], we have that W S (θ) = π S (θ) + CS(θ) since Southern government receives no tariff revenue when firm N chooses F DI. Proposition 6 (ii) then tells us that W S (θ) is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0, θ * ] and so is maximized when θ = θ * . Pick any θ = θ ∈ (θ * , 1) and compare W S (θ * ) and W S (θ ). Notice that, when θ = θ , firm N chooses home production and hence Southern government receives tariff revenue. That is, W S (θ ) = π S (θ ) + CS(θ )+tariff revenue. Hence the comparison between W S (θ * ) and W S (θ ) is not obvious even though we know π S (θ * ) > π S (θ ) and CS(θ * ) > CS(θ ) by Proposition 6 (ii).
Notice that the comparison between W S (θ * ) and W S (θ ) is equivalent to the comparison between W (θ * ) and W (θ ) because global welfare is Southern welfare plus firm N 's profit where firm N is indifferent between θ = θ * and θ = θ (that is,
Recall that q N = v H and q S = v L are global welfare-maximizing levels of firm N 's product quality and firm S's product quality, respectively. When θ = θ * , firm N chooses F DI and strategically reduces its product quality level to (1 − θ
is greater thanq S because of technology spillover (but still less than v L ). In contrast, when θ = θ , firm N chooses HP with q * N = v H and firm S chooses q * S =q S since there is no technology spillover. Under θ = θ * , firm N 's strategic reduction of its product quality reduces the net social benefit associated with the consumption of firm N 's product, whereas technology spillover increases the net social benefit associated with the consumption of firm S's product. We find that, when the population of type H consumers m H is relatively large, the former effect dominates the latter effect so that W (θ * ) < W (θ ) and hence W S (θ * ) < W S (θ ) hold, as formally stated in Proposition 7 below. Proposition 7. W S (θ) is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0, θ * ], and there exists a value m * such that W S (θ * ) < (=, >) W S (θ)| θ∈(θ * ,1) if m H > (=, <) m * , where m * > lim θ→θ * m H holds under a range of parameterizations and W S (θ) is constant for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1).
Notice that θ = θ * is the highest possible spillover rate under which firm N undertakes F DI, and hence F DI is most likely to benefit the South in equilibrium when θ = θ * . Proposition 7 tells us that, even when θ = θ * , F DI still hurts the South if the population of type H consumers is relatively large (that is,
The main driving force of this result is firm N 's strategic quality reduction, which reduces the net social benefit associated with the consumption of firm N 's product, leading to the negative welfare effect of F DI when m H is relatively large. See the last paragraph of this subsection on details.
Next we turn to global welfare W (θ Recall that, when θ = 0, firm N chooses F DI with q * N = v H and firm S chooses q * S =q S since there is no technology spillover. As the spillover rate increases from θ = 0, firm N 's equilibrium product quality q * N = (1 − θ)v H + θv L decreases because of the strategic quality reduction, and firm S's equilibrium product quality increases because of spillover. Consequently, as θ increases, q * N gets further away from the socially optimal level v H and this reduces the net social benefit associated with type H consumers' consumption, whereas q * S gets closer to the socially optimal level v L and this increases the net social benefit associated with type L consumers' consumption. Proposition 8 tells us that, when θ is relatively small, the latter effect dominates the former effect so that W (θ) is increasing in θ. It also says that, when m H is relatively large, former effects starts to dominate the latter when θ exceeds a thresholdθ so that W (θ) is decreasing in θ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ * ]. Once θ exceeds θ * , firm N chooses HP with q * N = v H and firm S chooses q * S =q S . Notice that these equilibrium quality choices are identical to those when θ = 0, implying that the equilibrium global welfare is the same under θ = 0 and θ ∈ (θ * , 1) (W (0) = W (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1)). This in turn implies that W (θ) is maximized when θ =θ.
We can now compare the optimal spillover rates for Southern welfare and global welfare. Corollay 2 says that, when the population of type H consumers m H is relatively large, the globally optimal spillover rate is strictly lower than Southern optimal spillover rate. Recall also that F DI always hurts, rather than benefits, the South (even when θ = θ * ) when m H is relatively large (Proposition 7).
The main driving force of these two welfare consequences of quality-enhancing technology spillover in our analysis is firm N 's strategic quality reduction. To see this, suppose that firm N cannot strategically reduce its product quality and must choose q N = v H for any given θ. We then find that there exists a value θ * * ∈ (0, 1] such that firm N undertakes F DI if and only if θ ≤ θ * * , where θ * * < 1 holds when t is relatively small. If θ * * < 1, firm S's equilibrium product quality is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ [0, θ * * ] because of technology spillover. This implies that equilibrium global welfare is maximized when θ = θ * * . Then, since firm N is indifferent between θ = θ * * and any θ ∈ (θ * * , 1), equilibrium Southern welfare is also maximized when θ = θ * * . That is, F DI benefits the South when θ is equal to or sufficiently close to θ * * , and θ W = θ S = θ * * holds, and hence neither of the two welfare consequences summarized in the previous paragraph does not hold in the absence of the strategic quality reduction.
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Economic and welfare consequences of tariff rates
In this subsection, we present an outline of comparative statics exercises concerning the tariff rate t, focusing on the cases in which the equilibrium of the game is a separating equilibrium for all t > 0.
24 Let π N (t), π S (t), CS(t), W S (t), and W (t) denote the profit of the Northern firm and the Southern firm, consumer surplus, Southern welfare, and global welfare in the equilibrium of the game, respectively. For expositional convenience, in this subsection we make a tie-breaking assumption that firm N chooses HP if it is indifferent between HP and F DI.
When t is relatively large, firm N chooses F DI to avoid tariff payment, whereas, when t is relatively small, firm N chooses HP to avoid technology spillovers. This is formalized in 
Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. For any given θ ∈ [0, 1), there exists a valuet(θ) ≥ 0 such that firm N chooses HP if t ≤t(θ) whereas it undertakes F DI if t >t(θ) in the equilibrium of the game. Furthermore,t(0) = 0,t(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ (0,θ), andt(θ) is constant for all θ ∈ [θ, 1), whereθ is as defined in Proposition 3.
When the spillover rate θ is zero, firm N is strictly better off by undertaking F DI for all t > 0, implyingt(0) = 0. As θ increases, F DI becomes less attractive option for firm N , and this implies that the thresholdt(θ) is increasing in θ.
When t ∈ [0,t(θ)], firm N chooses HP and q * N = v H whereas firm S chooses q * S =q S because no technology spills over from firm N to firm S under HP . Notice that equilibrium quality levels q * N and q * S are constant for all t ∈ [0,t(θ)], implying that the equilibrium global welfare
) is constant for all t ∈ [0,t(θ)]. Also, π N (t) is strictly decreasing in t and W S (t) is strictly increasing in t for all t ∈ [0,t(θ)] because firm N pays more tariff to the Southern government as t increases, and firm N is indifferent between HP and F DI when t =t(θ). The equilibrium Southern welfare W S (t) is therefore maximized when t =t(θ).
Once t exceedst(θ), firm N switches from HP to F DI, and further increase in t does not affect equilibrium profits and welfare. Given this, take any t >t(θ) and compare Southern welfare and global welfare under t =t(θ) and t = t . We obtain the following result. Suppose θ >θ. Proposition 3 tells us that q * N = v H and q * S = v L under F DI with t = t , whereas q * N = v H and q * S =q S under HP with t =t(θ). That is, the level of firm N 's product quality is at the socially optimal level under both HP and F DI and the level of firm S's product quality is also at the socially optimal level under F DI, but the level of firm S's product quality is below socially optimal level under HP . Hence we have W (t ) > W (t(θ)), which implies W S (t ) > W S (t(θ)) because firm N is indifferent between t = t and t =t(θ).
Next suppose θ ≤θ. Proposition 3 tells us that q *
under F DI with t = t , whereas q * N = v H and q * S =q S under HP with t =t(θ). The level of firm N 's product quality is below the socially optimal level under F DI due to its strategic quality reduction, whereas the level of firm S's product quality is below the socially optimal level under both F DI and HP , but the quality level is higher under F DI because of technology spillover. Given that firm N 's product is consumed by high valuation consumers and firm S's product by low valuation consumers, this implies that global and Southern welfare are both higher under HP when m H is relatively large, implying Proposition 10 (ii).
Proposition 10 tells us that F DI induced by a higher tariff rate hurts the South when the spillover rate is relatively low and the population of high valuation consumers is relatively large. It can be shown, as in the previous subsection, that the strategic quality reduction is the driving force of this negative welfare effect of F DI.
Quality-enhancing versus cost-reducing technology spillovers
In our model of quality-enhancing technology spillovers, we have demonstrated that the Northern firm strategically reduces its product quality under a broad range of parameterizations when it undertakes F DI in the South. And the strategic quality reduction is a driving force of our two main welfare and policy implications.
Would Northern firms choose strategy analogous to the strategic quality reduction when technology spillovers result in a reduction of Southern firms' production costs rather than an enhancement of their product quality? In order to provide an answer to this question, Nguyen (2011) has analyzed an international duopoly model with cost-reducing technology spillovers outlined as follows.
Firms N and S, respectively Northern firm and Southern firm, compete in the Southern market with a homogenous good. Firm N has better technology so that it incurs a lower level of marginal cost compared to firm S, holding other things constant. In addition, firm N can choose its supply strategy between home production (HP ) or undertaking F DI in the South, whereas firm S only produces in the South. A spillover rate, θ ∈ [0, 1), represents the strength of IP R protection in the South and captures the amount of knowledge spilled over from firm N to firm S if firm N undertakes F DI in the South. Specifically, when firm N undertakes F DI in the South, the marginal cost for firm S is reduced from c 0 (the marginal cost facing firm S if firm N chooses HP ) to min(c 0 − θ(c 0 − c f N ), c 0 ), where c f N is firm N 's marginal cost. With these specifications, θ plays a similar role to the spillover rate presented in subsection 4.1. A specific tariff, t, is imposed on import of firm N 's product. Nguyen (2011) finds that, firm N undertakes F DI if the spillover rate is relatively low and it chooses HP otherwise. However, regardless of its supply strategy, firm N always chooses the lowest marginal cost for its production. The logic behind this result goes as follows. Under F DI, firm N chooses zero marginal cost if the spillover rate is zero. When θ is positive, consider a small increase in firm N 's marginal cost by δ. On one hand, this reduces firm N 's profitability, keeping other things constant. On the other hand, this reduces firm S's marginal cost by δθ, which reduces cost difference between the two firms and intensifies competition. Thus, increasing marginal cost always hurts firm N so that it chooses the lowest possible marginal cost. Applying this result to the case of linear demand, Nguyen (2011) finds that when the spillover rate is set such that firm N is indifferent between HP and F DI, F DI always raises the level of Southern welfare and global welfare. The reason is that while firm N keeps its marginal cost plan the same under either supply strategies, firm S enjoys lower marginal cost if firm N undertakes F DI. Finally, global welfare-maximizing level of spillover rate is found to be either zero or the same as the South-optimal level, depending on tariff rate, t.
To compare between quality-enhancing and cost-reducing spillovers, we assume that the strategic reduction of Northern firm's product quality under quality-enhancing spillovers framework is equivalent to the intentional increasing of Northern firm's marginal cost under cost-reducing spillovers framework. In other words, if the Northern firm does not bring its best technology to the South then it either produces the product with lower quality, or at a higher marginal cost. It then follows that the analogous "strategic" reduction of Northern firm's product quality does not arise in the comparable model of cost-reducing technology spillovers. This also explains why F DI might hurt the South in the presence of qualityenhancing spillovers whereas it always benefits the South in the presence of cost-reducing spillovers. Note that, the result of Nguyen (2011)'s cost-reducing spillovers model concerning that F DI always benefits the South is consistent with Naghavi (2007) who analyzes technology spillovers which comes as a consequence of both F DI and R &D.
Policy implications
Stronger IP R protection in the South reduces the rate of technology spillovers, and this can induce Northern firms to undertake F DI in the South. Higher tariff rates in the South can also induce Northern firms to undertake F DI. Does Northern firms' F DI benefit the South? F DI can potentially benefit Southern firms and consumers through technology spillovers, but the Southern government loses its tariff revenue under F DI. The total effect of F DI on the South is therefore not immediately obvious in general. Our analysis demonstrates that the Northern firm may strategically reduce its product quality upon F DI, and, because of the strategic quality reduction, the Northern firm's F DI hurts the South when the population of high-valuation consumers is relatively large. In contrast, under an alternative assumption that the Northern firm cannot strategically reduce its product quality, the Northern firm's F DI benefits the South if the Southern government can optimally set the rate of technology spillovers in order to maximize Southern welfare in our model. Our analysis therefore suggests that the strategic quality reduction, which is often observed in reality (see Section 2), is an important issue to be considered when one accesses welfare impacts of F DI and technology spillovers in the contexts of quality-enhancing spillovers.
An equally important policy implication of our analysis is that we have identified the cases in which the spillover rate that maximizes global welfare is positive but lower than the level which maximizes Southern welfare. Suppose there is a social planner, who can set the spillover rate in the South. If Northern welfare is the only concern, the social planner would set the spillover rate equal to zero, whereas if Southern welfare is the only concern then she would choose the spillover rate that maximizes Southern welfare (which is positive). Should the social planner support the North by choosing zero spillover rate or support the South by choosing a positive spillover rate if she was to maximize total surplus of the North and the South? We demonstrate that, there are certain cases in which the social planner should neither support the North nor the South. This is because global-welfare maximizing level of spillovers could be positive but lower than South-optimal level (that is, 0 < θ W < θ S ), due to the Northern firm's strategic reduction of its product quality when it undertakes F DI in the South, as detailed in the previous subsection.
In practice, TRIPS agreement, administered by WTO, is by far the most influential agreement that is related to international IP R issues. The objective of the TRIPS agreement was to enforce the level of IP R protection in Southern countries to the level accepted globally, normally those proposed by Northern countries.
25 The agreement also aims to "contribute to promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology... in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare." As pointed out by Lai and Qiu (2003) and other authors, for the purpose of maximizing global welfare, the level of IP R protection in Southern countries should be set equal to or even stronger than that adopted in Northern countries (see also Diwan and Rodrik 1991) . In contrast, our analysis suggests that, WTO should take into account the costs and benefits associated with technology spillovers in Southern countries as a consequence of Northern firms' F DI. In doing so, WTO might allow the presence of positive spillovers in the South to some degree but require that the level of spillovers is lower than what Southern countries desire. This result, which is unique to quality-enhancing spillovers, suggests the active roles to be played by WTO in reconciling the North-South conflict concerning the level of IP R protection in the Southern countries.
Conclusion
Technology spillovers induced by F DI usually improves performance of the local firms at the cost of the foreign firms. This has become an important issue in the international trade literature. Various papers have analyzed technology spillovers from Northern firms to Southern firms that reduce the latter's marginal cost (Chin & Grossman, 1990, among others) . Incorporating F DI in such cost-reducing technology spillovers framework, previous authors have found that, Northern F DI usually benefits the South (Glass & Saggi, 2002; Naghavi 2007 ).
The present paper departs from this literature by exploring an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with technology spillovers. We have shown that, the conventional argument that F DI accompanied by technology spillovers benefits the South does not necessarily hold in the presence of quality-enhancing technology spillovers. The driving force of this result is the strategic reduction of the Northern firm's product quality under F DI, which happens in a range of parameterizations. This strategic quality reduction reduces the net social benefits associated with the consumption of Northern firm's product, and thus it hurts the South. We have also found that, the global welfare-maximizing level of spillovers is positive but could be lower than the South-optimal level. These finding lends a support to the WTO in that, through TRIPS agreement, WTO can reconcile the North-South conflict concerning the level of IP R protection in the Southern countries.
Similar implications for trade policy are also embodied in our analysis. Particularly, since F DI could hurt the South, implementing a high trade barrier to attract F DI with technology spillovers might not be a good choice for Southern countries. This suggests that Southern governments should carefully assess the impact of spillovers, especially those are associated with product quality.
In summary, this paper contributes to international trade and F DI literature in a number of ways. First, we have constructed an international duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with technology spillovers to study the location choice of a Northern firm between home-production and F DI. We then analyzed the equilibrium quality levels the Northern firm and the Southern firm would choose for their product. By exploring these strategic choices of product quality, we have discovered novel policy implications of qualityenhancing technology spillovers, which are also consistent with reality.
Let us now find the values of q i k * . First, consider the HP subgame. In the separating equilibrium of this subgame, the pricing constraints are given by: 
and the equality can not hold (when both firms choose same product quality then they engage in Bertrand pricing game and each makes a zero profit). Therefore, q HP N > q HP S . The problem facing firm S becomes:
Firm N takes firm S's product quality as given to solve his problem:
The solutions are given by: q HP S * =q S and q HP N * = v H . The profits accrued to firm N and firm S in the separating equilibrium of HP subgame are respectively given by π HP
Now, let us explore the F DI subgame. In the separating equilibrium of this subgame, the pricing constraint will be similar to that of HP subgame. Since firm S sells to type L consumers, it has the response function
otherwise. Anticipating this, firm N solves its problem:
There are two relevant options for firm N . The first option is to make the constraintq S (q F DI 
] and firm S obtains profit
We can now focus on HP subgame to find the necessary conditions for separating SPNE within this subgame to exist, as formalized in Claim 1 and 2. 
That is, firm S will choose p HP
type S consumers still purchase from firm S, so that it sells to all consumers and firm N sells nothing. Since firm N never chooses a price below its average cost, 
this profit is non-positive so that firm S will not deviate. If t >
, for firm S to be better off under separating equilibrium, we need π HP
≡m H1 , which also requires t <
Claim 2. Consider HP subgame. In this subgame, firm N only sells to type H consumers if
, andm H1 = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Assume firm N deviates from separating equilibrium of HP subgame, choosing q HP 
, this profit is non-positive and firm N will not deviate. If
, for firm N to be better off under separating equilibrium, we need π HP 
2 , so that firm N sells to all consumers and firm S sells nothing. The profit of the firm N from deviation will be π F DI
• If θ >θ, for firm N to be better off under separating equilibrium, we need π F DI
> 0, which always holds.
•
=m H2 . Note that the denominator ofm H2 is positive because following its deviation from separating SPNE, firm N reduces its quality from
so that per-consumer profit declines for two reasons: (i) it reduces its quality from separating equilibrium level, and (ii) once reaching q N =q S +θv L 1+θ , it even has to reduce its price further to preempt firm S from selling. The denominator ofm H2 simply captures this per-consumer profit reduction.
Q.E.D.
andm H3 = 0 otherwise, and (ii) the separating SPNE of the game is an HP equilibrium if t <t and m H > max(m H1 ,m H4 ),
Proof. Let us compare firm N 's profit in the separating SPNE of HP and F DI subgames when θ >θ. It follows that F DI is better for firm
In other cases, HP makes firm N better off.
• For the separating SPNE of the game to be an F DI equilibrium, beside condition t ≥t, we need firm N 's profit if it deviates to sell to all consumers in HP subgame is lower than its profit in such an SPNE, π HP
Claim 4 then provides sufficient condition.
• For the separating SPNE of the game to be an HP equilibrium, beside condition t <t, we need firm N 's profit if it deviates to sell to all consumers in F DI subgame is lower than its profit in such an equilibrium, π F DI
−t ≡m H4 . Note that the denominator of m H4 is positive since firm N s' per-consumer profit in SPNE of HP subgame is higher than that in SPNE of F DI subgame which is higher than per-consumer profit it gets by deviation (see similar logic in the proof of Claim 4). The sufficient condition is then given by Claim 2. Note that,
Claim 6. Assume θ ≤θ. Then, (i) the separating SPNE of the game is an F DI equilibrium if t ≥t and m H > max(m H2 ,m H5 ),
andm H5 = 0 otherwise,
], and (ii) the separating SPNE of the game is an HP equilibrium if t <t and m H > max(m H1 ,m H4 ).
Proof. Let us compare profit of firm N under separating SPNE of F DI and HP subgames when θ ≤θ. It follows that F DI is better for firm
Note that, by defining
, θ * ∈ [0, 1), then it can be established that if θ ≤ θ * then firm N chooses F DI, and it chooses HP otherwise. 26
• For the separating SPNE of the game to be an F DI equilibrium, beside condition t ≥ t, we need firm N 's profit by deviating from this SPNE to sell to all consumers under HP will be lower, π HP
], which is always true if t ≥
+t ≡m H5 . Note that the denominator ofm H5 is positive thanks to per-consumer profit firm N obtains under SPNE of F DI subgame is higher than that in HP subgame and higher than per-consumer profit it gets from deviation (see more on this logic in proof of Claim 4 and 5). Claims 4 then provides sufficient condition.
• For the separating SPNE of the game to be an HP equilibrium, beside condition t <t, we need firm N 's profit by deviating from this SPNE to sell to all consumers under F DI is lower than the profit it reaps in such an SPNE, π >t then θ * >θ and by defining θ * = 1, the separating SPNE is then an F DI equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
With the help of Claims 1-6, the proof of Proposition 1 is constructed as we define:
max(m H2 ,m H3 ) if θ >θ and t ≥t max(m H1 ,m H4 ) if θ >θ and t <t max(m H2 ,m H5 ) if θ ≤θ and t ≥t max(m H1 ,m H4 ) if θ ≤θ and t <t Finally, sincem H2 andm H4 are weakly decreasing in θ,m H1 andm H3 are independent of θ whilẽ m H5 is weakly increasing in θ ∈ [0, θ * ], if m H > lim θ→θ * m H then the game has a separating equilibrium for all θ ∈ [0, 1). Similarly, sincem H1 andm H3 are decreasing in t,m H2 andm H5 are independent of t whilem H4 is increasing in t ∈ [0,t], if m H > lim t→tm H then the game has a separating equilibrium for all t ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
If t ≥t, for all θ in (0,θ), from the proof of Claim 6 above, θ * =
so that the separating SPNE of the game is an F DI equilibrium for all θ ∈ (0,θ]. Furthermore, for all θ ∈ (θ, 1), following the proof of Claim 5 above, the separating SPNE of the game is an F DI equilibrium. Hence, we can re-define θ * = 1 to formalize the proof of Proposition 2. If t <t, sincet ≤
, it follows that θ * <θ as proof of Claim 6 stated. Then,
is increasing in t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof comes directly from proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The proof comes directly from proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 for the case in which t ≥t. In the case of t <t, since θ * <θ, definingθ ≡ θ * leads to Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4, 5.
If θ >θ then under separating equilibrium of F DI subgame, firm N chooses q F DI N * = v H while firm S chooses q F DI S * = v L , so that π N (θ), π S (θ), CS(θ), W S (θ) are all independent of θ.
If θ ≤θ then in the separating equilibrium of F DI subgame (see also proof of Claim 3), it follows that sign[
If θ increases from θ =θ to θ >θ then global welfare is maximized which in turn implies W S (θ ) > W S (θ) (since firm N 's profit evaluated at θ =θ and at θ = θ are the same). Furthermore, since firm S chooses higher product quality at θ = θ , CS(θ ) > CS(θ) and π S (θ ) > π S (θ) hold. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.
If θ > θ * , the separating SPNE of the game is an HP equilibrium where firm N chooses q HP N * = v H and firm S chooses q HP S * =q S , so that π N (θ), π S (θ), CS(θ), W S (θ) are all independent of θ. If θ ≤ θ * then the separating SPNE of the game is an F DI equilibrium, and firm N chooses q F DI N * = q N while firm S chooses q F DI S * =q S (q N ). Hence, sign[ If θ increases from θ = θ * to θ ≥ θ * , by Proposition 3 and Lemma 1, firm S chooses lower product quality, thus CS(θ ) < CS(θ * ) and π S (θ ) < π S (θ * ) hold. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.
An increase in θ from θ * to θ > θ * switches the equilibrium of the game from F DI to HP , so that global welfare changes from W (θ * ) = m H (q
2 ), where
The first three terms in the LHS of the equation respectively represent firm N 's profit, firm S's profit, and consumer surplus under HP , whereas three terms in the RHS of the equation respectively represent firm N 's profit, firm S's profit, and consumer surplus under F DI at θ =θ ≡ θ * . Firm N 's profit is the same in both LHS and RHS. , so that
, which is positive when θ = 0. Furthermore, 
≡ m * * . Note that, we can always restrict parameters such that the denominator of m * becomes small so that m * > lim θ→θ * * m H . Finally, since either at θ = 0 (F DI) or at any θ = θ > θ * (HP ), firm N chooses q N = v H while firm S chooses q S =q S , it follows that W (θ = 0) = m H Proof of the case firm N is required to choose q N = v H under F DI.
Under F DI equilibrium, given firm N chooses q * N = v H , firm S chooses q * S = min{v L ,q S (v H )}. Assume first that v L ≥q S (v H ) =q S + θ(v H −q S ) then q * S =q S + θ(v H −q S ). Then comparing
